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RECONCILING THE VOLCKER RULE WITH THE 
DODD-FRANK ACT’S OBJECTIVES:  HOW TO 
BEST COMBAT SYSTEMIC RISK 
Michael Leonidas Nester* 
 
This Note examines the Dodd-Frank Act’s ban on proprietary trading and 
on banks sponsoring hedge funds and private equity funds, known as the 
Volcker Rule.  This Rule has been a point of contention since the Act was 
passed in 2010.  Some argue that the ban is either a detriment to bond market 
liquidity or is unnecessary because a tenuous nexus exists between 
proprietary trading and true causes of the 2008 financial crisis.  Proponents 
cite the role of proprietary trading in the crisis and the inherent risk that 
banks accept when engaging in such trading.  The controversy surrounding 
the Volcker Rule has led individuals in politics and finance to discuss whether 
to amend, or even repeal, the Rule. 
This Note explores arguments for and against the Volcker Rule and 
ultimately offers recommendations to amend the Rule while maintaining its 
(and Dodd-Frank’s) venerable goal of curbing systemic risk.  First, this Note 
begins with a discussion of the causes of the financial crisis and systemic risk 
before explaining the Rule’s provisions.  This background provides the 
groundwork for the ongoing debate about the Volcker Rule and whether there 
should be a change in the language of the Rule.  Proponents and opponents 
have clashed on multiple issues, such as whether proprietary trading played 
a significant role in the financial crisis and whether it actually reduces 
systemic risk.  Understanding arguments on both sides is crucial to assess 
whether and how the Volcker Rule should be amended in light of systemic 
risk.  This Note concludes that neither outright repeal of the Rule nor leaving 
it fully intact are appropriate.  Rather, this Note offers recommendations to 
amend it in a way that balances banks’ desires to engage in profitable trading 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2008 shook the U.S. economy and caused 
Americans to lose faith in financial markets.  While the causes of the crisis 
are debated, many entities were held accountable for this economic collapse.1  
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was tasked with 
determining the causes of the crisis, and its final report assigned blame to 
 
 1. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT:  FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter FCIC FINAL REPORT], 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAD9-
DZT9]. 
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many private actors in the financial sector2 but also chastised public entities 
for their role in the crisis.3  Banking institutions shared much of the blame.4 
Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on July 21, 2010, in response to 
the crisis, which reflected concern for the role banks played in causing these 
financial troubles.5  The Act’s stated purpose illustrates the government’s 
focus on curtailing banking institutions’ reckless behavior and protecting the 
nation’s financial stability.  This purpose makes clear that the Act seeks “[t]o 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to 
fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices.”6 
Dodd-Frank has proven to be a point of contention, especially as talk about 
amending the law consumed Capitol Hill after the 2016 presidential election.7  
One of the Act’s most prominent provisions is the Volcker Rule, which is 
implemented in Title VI of the Act and named for former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker.8  The Rule’s aim to prohibit proprietary trading 
remains contentious in the national discussion of post-financial crisis banking 
regulations.9 
 
 2. Id. at xxv (“[T]he failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of 
financial destruction.”). 
 3. Id. at xxi (“[T]he government was ill prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent 
response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.”). 
 4. See id. at xviii–xix (“[D]ramatic failure of corporate governance and risk management 
at many systematically important financial institutions were a key cause of this crisis. . . .  We 
conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency 
put the financial system on a collision course with crisis.”).  While a majority of the 
Commission’s members concluded that financial institutions were at least partially culpable, 
the final report includes two dissents that question the blame assigned to these institutions.  
For more information on these dissents, see infra Part I.A.I, which alludes to research that 
suggests that proprietary trading, which the Volcker Rule prohibits, played no role in the 
financial crisis. 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 6. Id. pmbl., 124 Stat. at 1376. 
 7. See Gabriel T. Rubin, Biden Defends Dodd-Frank, Other Obama Financial-
Regulation Policies, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2016, 6:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
biden-defends-dodd-frank-other-obama-financial-regulation-policies-1480975072 
[https://perma.cc/4HTS-7DN3]; see also Robert Schmidt, Trump Administration to Call for 
Modest Changes to Banking Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2017, 1:52 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-12/trump-administration-to-call-for-
modest-changes-to-banking-rules [https://perma.cc/U98V-3LXU]. 
 8. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); see also William J. Sweet, Jr. & Brian D. Christiansen, 
The Volcker Rule, SKADDEN 1 n.1, https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSR_ 
The_Volcker_Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/B77W-CTVM]. 
 9. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank:  Why Financial 
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 
1073–74 (2012) (noting that there is “almost no evidence that proprietary trading was 
responsible for the failure of any financial institution” in the crisis and that the Volcker Rule 
“contains numerous loopholes and exceptions”); see also Dakin Campbell, Blankfein Says 
Banks Should Be Unshackled from Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2017, 3:37 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-09/blankfein-says-banks-should-be-
unshackled-from-volcker-rule [https://perma.cc/VPW4-DRB8] (noting that Lloyd Blankfein, 
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In general, banks engage in proprietary trading when they invest for their 
own direct gain instead of trading on behalf of clients for a commission.10  
The Rule defines proprietary tradingsuch as derivative transactions 
creating counterparty risk11to include instances in which banking entities 
act as the principal for their own trading accounts12 to buy or sell securities, 
derivatives, futures, options, or any other securities determined by certain 
federal agencies.13 
President Donald Trump has promised to amend the Volcker Rule since 
his presidency began, and the Treasury Department has already taken steps 
toward that goal.14  Those in favor of the Rule cite concern for the dangers 
associated with a further deregulated banking industry, given the risks 
associated with proprietary trading.15  Opponents, conversely, downplay 
proprietary trading’s role in the crisis:  this mitigation would render the Rule 
unnecessary when trying to rectify the irresponsibility in the financial 
industry that led to the crisis,16 especially given its detrimental effect on 
banking institutions.17 
This Note assesses whether and how the Volcker Rule should be amended 
in light of its aim to reduce systemic risk in the U.S. financial system.  The 
 
Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., believes that the Volcker Rule hinders a 
“market-making function that provides a valuable public service”); Schmidt, supra note 7 
(“The Treasury Department’s much anticipated report on banking regulations is set to include 
measured proposals for revising post-crisis rules, indicating the Trump administration is more 
focused on scaling back the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act than blowing it up.”). 
 10. See Proprietary Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
p/proprietarytrading.asp [https://perma.cc/AVQ9-GGFL] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (“Firms 
or banks that engage in proprietary trading believe that they have a competitive advantage that 
will enable them to earn excess returns.”). 
 11. See infra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing how various interdependencies 
between banks produce systemic risk). 
 12. The Volcker Rule defines “trading account” as 
any account used for acquiring or taking positions in the securities and instruments 
described in [the rule’s proprietary trading definition] principally for the purpose of 
selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from 
short-term price movements), and any such other accounts as the appropriate Federal 
banking agencies . . . determine. 
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6). 
 13. Id. § 1851(h)(4) (“Engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking 
entity . . . in any transaction to purchase or sell . . . any security, any derivative, any contract 
of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or 
contract, or any other security . . . that the appropriate Federal banking 
agencies . . . determine.”). 
 14. See Schmidt, supra note 7.  To view the Treasury Department’s full evaluation of the 
Volcker Rule and other banking regulations, see infra note 185. 
 15. See Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Statement on the Volcker Rule:  
Reducing Systemic Risk by Banning Excessive Proprietary Trading with Depositors’ Money 
(Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/2013-spch121013laa 
[https://perma.cc/HC6C-EJA9] (“The recent financial crisis and subsequent events show the 
dangers that can result when banks trade for their own accounts while disregarding their 
customers’ interests.”). 
 16. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 1073 (“[T]he Volcker Rule faces political problems.  First, 
there is almost no evidence that proprietary trading was responsible for the failure of any 
financial institution in the 2008 crisis.”). 
 17. See Campbell, supra note 9. 
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Rule hopes to further Dodd-Frank’s goals of promoting financial stability and 
ending “too big to fail” and bailouts,18 although there are conflicting reports 
about whether the Rule actually does so.19  Part I explains the alleged causes 
of the financial crisis, systemic risk, and the Volcker Rule’s various 
provisions.  Part II then discusses arguments both for and against the Volcker 
Rule and whether it adequately reduces systemic risk.  Finally, Part III offers 
recommendations for how to amend the Volcker Rule to allow banks to 
continue engaging in profitable trading while ensuring they do not engage in 
excessive risk-taking. 
I.  ORIGINS OF THE VOLCKER RULE 
The financial crisis of 2008 prompted polarizing discussions about the 
adequacy of American financial regulations.  Systemic risk became a key 
issue as the crisis marred many American consumers’ views on the financial 
system’s integrity and reputation.  Congress had an opportunity to curtail 
systemic risk after the crisis and used the Volcker Rule as a tool to further 
this laudable goal, which was set forth in Dodd-Frank.20  This Part reviews 
systemic risk and alleged causes of the financial crisis and discusses the 
Volcker Rule’s various provisions.  Part I.A discusses the financial crisis 
generally, while Part I.B discusses the Volcker Rule. 
A.  Financial Crisis:  Concerns About Systemic Risk and 
Tightened Financial Regulations 
To set up this Note’s introduction to the Volcker Rule,21 this Part analyzes 
the financial crisis and how it prompted arguments about its causes as well 
as systemic risk in the banking system.  Part I.A.1 begins with an overview 
of various arguments about what caused the crisis.  Part I.A.2 explains the 
concept of systemic risk and how it pertains to the crisis. 
1.  Causes of the Financial Crisis 
Conversations about the financial crisis quickly become contentious, due 
in part to uncertainty surrounding its principal causes.  As noted above, the 
FCIC released a report in 2011, which examined the causes of the then-
current financial and economic crisis.22  The report, which contains one 
majority and two dissenting opinions, recognizes the difficulties in 
 
 18. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 19. Compare Julie A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, 4 WM. 
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 181, 211–12 (2013) (“The claims that the . . . Volcker rule walls are 
needed to decrease systemic risk have not been supported. . . .  [W]e need a better 
understanding of systemic risk before we erect a wall that may decrease economies of scope 
and complementaries of these businesses.”), with Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, supra note 
15 (“Today’s adoption [of the Volcker Rule] is a step forward in reining in speculative risk-
taking by banking entities and preventing future crises.”). 
 20. See 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012). 
 21. See infra Part I.B. 
 22. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. 
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understanding the “broad and sometimes arcane subjects” it attempts to 
explain to the many people who suffered in the wake of the crisis.23 
The FCIC’s majority assigned blame to private and public entities alike.  
Government housing policies set aggressive goals to extend credit to families 
in need of mortgages,24 which led to the collapse of mortgage-lending 
standards and allowed the mortgage-securitization pipeline to fuel 
irresponsible lending.25  On the consumer side, lenders often willfully 
disregarded borrowers’ inability to pay their mortgages, and when home 
prices began to crash and borrowers defaulted, this collapse “lit and spread 
the flame of contagion and crisis.”26  On the banking side, as financial 
institutions began to create residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), 
their excessive borrowing with these risky investments made them 
susceptible to disaster if their investment values dropped even slightly.27  The 
majority opinion in the FCIC report called risk management at these 
institutions a dramatic failure, which allowed banks to recklessly take on too 
much risk with too little capital.28  Not only was the government “ill 
prepared” for the crisis,29 but credit rating agencies enabled the crisis as they 
allowed investors to rely on their “seal of approval” of RMBSs.30 
The majority particularly criticizes failures of corporate governance and 
risk management at “systemically important financial institutions” as a “key 
cause” of the crisis.31  These institutions began to engage in riskier trades 
over time as they “took on enormous exposures in acquiring and supporting 
subprime lenders and creating, packaging, repackaging, and selling trillions 
of dollars in mortgage-related securities.”32  They had inadequate 
compensation systems that rewarded short-term gains without considering 
long-term consequences, which further diluted banks’ sense of risk 
management.33  The majority opinion noted “stunning instances” of 
governance breakdowns, highlighted by Merrill Lynch’s shock when its $55 
billion in “super-safe” RMBSs resulted in billions of dollars in losses.34 
The FCIC’s report concluded that large banks were at least partially 
culpable, but its two dissents questioned the blame assigned to those banks.35  
 
 23. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xii. 
 24. See id. at xxvii. 
 25. See id. at xxiii. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at xix. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at xxi. 
 30. Id. at xxv (“From 2000 to 2007, Moody’s rated nearly 45,000 mortgage-related 
securities as triple-A.  This compares with six private-sector companies in the United States 
that carried this coveted rating in early 2010.  In 2006 alone, Moody’s put its triple-A stamp 
of approval on 30 mortgage-related securities every working day.  The results were disastrous:  
83% of the mortgage securities rated triple-A that year ultimately were downgraded.”). 
 31. Id. at xviii. 
 32. Id. at xix.  To emphasize this point, the majority’s authors analogized banks to ancient 
Greek mythology:  “Like Icarus, they never feared flying ever closer to the sun.” Id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 411, 441. 
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The dissenters’ claims give context to arguments alluding to how proprietary 
trading lacked a role in the crisis.36 
At the FCIC, Commissioner Keith Hennessey, Commissioner Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin, and Vice Chairman Bill Thomas wrote the report’s first 
dissenting view.  Their opinion focuses on the global nature of the financial 
crisis as a counterargument to the majority’s call for “across-the-board more 
restrictive regulations, in conjunction with more aggressive regulators and 
supervisors.”37  The dissenting opinion noted that many large European 
financial firmswhose regulatory and supervisory processes differed from 
that of U.S. firmsalso failed, even though not all of them were exposed to 
U.S. housing assets.38  Many of these firms actually had stricter financial 
regulations but still failed in similar ways to their U.S. counterparts.39  The 
dissent then posed a rhetorical question about U.S. financial regulations:  
“How can the ‘runaway mortgage securitization train’ detailed in the 
majority’s report explain housing bubbles in Spain, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom, countries with mortgage finance systems vastly different than that 
in the United States?”40  This inquiry highlights some of these dissenters’ 
skepticism of the majority opinion’s call for tighter financial regulations after 
the crisis. 
This dissent lists ten causes, global and domestic, that, its authors believe, 
explain the financial crisis.41  It does not reference proprietary trading.  First, 
a global credit bubble appeared in the late 1990s when large developing 
countries maintained large capital surpluses and loaned these savings to the 
United States and Europewhere the bubble formedcausing interest rates 
to fall.42  This decreased the cost of borrowing for risky financial 
instruments.43  Second, a housing bubble appeared in the United States, to 
which “many factors” contributed.44  Third, with increasing optimism about 
U.S. housing prices and cheap credit, mortgage originators engaged in poor 
origination practices that extended “nontraditional mortgages” to borrowers, 
which were sometimes deceptive, often beyond borrowers’ ability to repay, 
and frequently confusing.45  Fourth, the dissenters highlight failed credit 
ratings and securitization.  Banks “transformed bad mortgages into toxic 
financial assets,” which combined with erroneous credit ratings to facilitate 
the creation of more bad mortgages.46 
 
 36. For further discussion on competing arguments about proprietary trading’s role in the 
financial crisis, see infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
 37. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 414. 
 38. See id. at 414–15. 
 39. See id. at 415. 
 40. Id. at 416. 
 41. See id. at 417–19. 
 42. See id. at 417–18. 
 43. See id. at 417. 
 44. Id. at 418 (“The bubble was characterized both by national increases in house prices 
well above the historical trend and by rapid regional boom-and-bust cycles.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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Fifth, financial institutions concentrated correlated-housing risk as they bet 
on high housing prices and held substantial amounts of housing debt on their 
balance sheets.47  Sixth, banks held far too little capital and became too highly 
leveraged, which amplified liquidity risk.48  Seventh, the risk of contagion is 
described as an “essential cause of the crisis.”49  Large firms’ 
interconnectedness created counterparty credit risk, which led certain banks 
to be deemed “too big to fail” and highlighted systemic risk inherent in the 
financial system.50  Eighth, large housing losses created a common shock that 
hit both large and small banks, but especially the large ones that were 
undercapitalized.51  Ninth, financial shock and panic ensued in late 2008 after 
“failures, near-failures, and restructurings of ten firms triggered a global 
financial panic.”52  Finally, the shock and panic catalyzed the economic 
crisis, which created severe harm to the real economy that is still felt today.53 
FCIC Commissioner Peter J. Wallison and Arthur F. Burns, a fellow in 
Financial Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, wrote the 
report’s second dissenting view.  Their conclusion criticized the majority’s 
call for stricter regulations by questioning whether any financial system, 
however heavily regulated, could have survived the blow that the U.S. 
housing market was dealt.54  They direct most blame to the vast number of 
risky mortgages, whose values depreciated rapidly as the housing bubble 
began to deflate.  They note that “the role played by the housing policies of 
the United States government over the course of two administrations” was 
the but-for cause of the risky mortgages and their subsequent decline in 
value.55 
Wallison and Burns rejected several alleged causes of the crisis that the 
majority highlighted.  First, to combat the notion that deregulation was a 
primary cause, they noted that no significant deregulation occurred since 
before the 1980s.56  Despite the repeal of Glass-Steagall provisions,57 which 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 419. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 469 (“Instead of thinking through what would almost certainly happen when 
these [housing] assets virtually disappeared from balance sheets, many observersincluding 
the Commission majority in their reportpivoted immediately to blame the ‘weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities’ of the free market or the financial or regulatory system, without considering 
whether any system could have survived such a blow.”). 
 55. Id. at 451 (“As a result of these [housing] policies, by the middle of 2007, there were 
approximately 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages in the U.S. financial system—half 
of all mortgages outstanding—with an aggregate value of over $4.5 trillion.  These were 
unprecedented numbers, . . . and the losses associated with the delinquency and default of 
these mortgages fully account for the weakness and disruption of the financial system that has 
become known as the financial crisis.”). 
 56. Id. at 445. 
 57. In 1933, Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act to help prevent bank runs and 
mitigate shocks in financial markets. Id. at 29.  Among other things, it “strictly limited 
commercial banks’ participation in the securities markets” as a partial response to highly 
speculative trading in the 1920s that preceded the Great Depression. Id. at 32. 
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allowed commercial and investment banks to affiliate, there is “no evidence 
. . . that any bank got into trouble because of a securities affiliate.”58  The 
losses that banks incurred were due to low quality mortgages, and Glass-
Steagall had always permitted trading RMBSs.59 
Second, the majority scorned financial institutions for having inadequate 
risk management.60  Wallison and Burns explained that this claim is easy to 
argue with the benefit of hindsight: 
[I]t is easy to condemn managers for failing to see the dangers of the 
housing bubble or the underpricing of risk that now looks so clear . . . .  The 
fact that virtually all participants in the financial system failed to foresee 
this crisisas they failed to foresee every other crisisdoes not tell us 
anything about why this crisis occurred or what we should to do prevent 
the next one.61 
 Third, the majority criticized securitization and structured products, which 
facilitated the flow of toxic assets.62  Wallison and Burns stated that the 
inherent problem was with the risky loans that securitization financed rather 
than with the securitization process itself.63  When discussing collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO)64 specifically, the dissenters noted that despite “all 
their dramatic content,” they were merely a path on which risky loans 
traveled throughout the global financial system to cause the actual losses in 
the crisis.65 
Finally, the majority assigned blame to predatory lending, which Wallison 
and Burns agreed “undoubtedly occurred.”66  However, they encouraged 
looking at the other side of these transactions as well.  Despite predatory 
lending, borrowers benefited from low mortgage underwriting standards to 
receive mortgages “they knew they could not pay unless rising housing prices 
enabled them to sell or refinance.”67  These “predatory borrowers” were a 
key contributor to the facilitation of high-risk mortgages in the financial 
system.68 
Despite stark differences between the report’s three opinions, the majority 
is correct in stating that conclusions about the financial crisis “must be 
viewed in the context of human nature.”69  The majority noted that blaming 
the crisis on greed alone is simplistic and that a few “bad actors” cannot be 
 
 58. Id. at 446. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. at xviii–xix. 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. See id. at xxiii. 
 63. See id. at 447. 
 64. See generally Collateralized Debt Obligation, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp?optly_redirect=integrated&lgl=myfinance-
layout-no-ads [https://perma.cc/S7HX-JPRN] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (defining a CDO as 
“a structured financial product that pools together cash flow-generating assets and repackages 
this asset pool into discrete tranches that can be sold to investors”). 
 65. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 447. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at xxii. 
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blamed for a crisis of this proportion.70  The majority ultimately stated, “[I]t 
was the failure to account for human weakness that is relevant to this 
crisis.”71  Despite the contentiousness surrounding discussions of the alleged 
causes of the financial crisis, it is crucial to recognize the debate surrounding 
these causes as this Note turns to a discussion of systemic risk and later to 
how the Volcker Rule attempts to curb it. 
2.  Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk has no formal definition, but according to Professor Julie 
Manasfi, “systemic risk in general can be thought of as a cascading failure, 
like dominoes, that affects the real economy.”72  Various working definitions 
of the phrase have been recognized and typically focus on economic shocks 
and interconnectedness.73  For instance, the Group of Ten74 has used the 
following definition that concerns effects on the real economy: 
Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of 
economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainly 
about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to 
quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real economy . . . .  
The adverse real economic effects from systemic problems are generally 
seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit flows, and 
from the destruction of asset values.75 
Even absent a formal definition, systemic risk is crucial to understand 
because banking entities play a unique role in the stability of the U.S. 
financial system. 
Systemic risk in the financial system involves “a potential cascading 
failure in a system or market due to . . . interdependencies”76 where “the 
failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly 
contribute to the failure of other significant financial institutions.”77  This 
hazard is significant because the financial system affects the real economy 
 
 70. Id. at xxiii. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Manasfi, supra note 19, at 191.  The “real economy” is defined as the part of the 
economy concerned with producing goods and services rather than buying and selling in 
financial markets. See Definition of Real Economy, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term? 
term=real-economy [https://perma.cc/AG4T-WPY4] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 73. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:  Towards 
an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2011) (noting that multiple, 
and sometimes inconsistent, definitions have been used, while providing an example focused 
on economic shock and market failure). 
 74. The “Group of Ten” is a group of countries that have agreed to lend money to the 
International Monetary Fund. See S.N. CHAND, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 153 (2006). 
 75. GROUP OF TEN, REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 126 (2001), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LCU-X34J]. 
 76. Manasfi, supra note 19, at 189. 
 77. Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010). 
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directly and significantly through bank lending.78  Such danger can also 
hinder the “multiplier effect,” the dynamic between banks and borrowers 
whereby changes in bank deposits change the money supply and the amount 
of outstanding credit.79  When a bank receives a deposit, it may keep a portion 
of it on reserve and loan out the rest, which increases the economy’s money 
supply.80  The borrower of that subsequently loaned-out portion can deposit 
it in a bank that in turn keeps a portion of that deposit and loans out the rest.81  
Systemic risk’s threat to this dynamic can create a gradual collapse in the 
financial system that eventually ripples into the real economy and can create 
distress beyond just banks and investors.82 
Professor Hal Scott identified four interdependencies between banks that 
produce systemic risk, but only one—counterparty risk on derivative 
transactions—is relevant to this analysis.83  These transactions create 
counterparty risk and were a key issue in the 2008 crisis.84  Credit default 
swaps (CDS) were widely held derivatives, and investors seeking to hedge 
against losses from RMBSs fueled their popularity.85  This practice 
encouraged the mortgage-securitization pipeline that ultimately collapsed.86  
When the housing bubble burst and RMBSs lost their value, CDS holders 
sought protection from the CDS seller who insured their principals, which 
caused sellers to incur tremendous losses: 
[W]hen the housing bubble popped and crisis followed, derivatives were in 
the center of the storm.  AIG, which had not been required to put aside 
capital reserves as a cushion for the protection it was selling, was bailed out 
 
 78. See id. at 673 n.7; see also Manasfi, supra note 19, at 189 (citing Adam B. Ashcraft, 
Are Banks Really Special?:  New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced Failure of Healthy Banks, 
95 AM. ECON. REV. 1712, 1728 (2005)). 
 79. Multiplier Effect, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/ 
multipliereffect.asp [https://perma.cc/P98V-QPBA] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
 80. See Manasfi, supra note 19, at 189. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 191. 
 83. See Scott, supra note 77, at 673–75.  The other three interdependencies Scott discusses 
are interbank deposits through loans and correspondent accounts, net settlement payment 
systems, and imitative bank runs. Id. 
 84. Id. at 675 (“Here the concern is that if institution X fails to settle its derivative position 
with institution Y, both X and Y will fail.  If Y in turn cannot settle its positions, other 
institutions will also fail.”).  These derivative transactions are also particularly important when 
considering the failure of nonbanks. Id. (“This is one area in which the failure of non-banks is 
a major concern, but the severity of this form of systemic risk and the degree of 
interconnectedness among financial institutions is currently unknown.”). 
 85. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv.  Credit default swaps are a type of 
derivative that transfers credit exposure from fixed income products between two or more 
parties. See Credit Default Swaps–CDS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp [https://perma.cc/5LQE-962E] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).  An 
investor who buys a fixed income asset, like a bond, may also purchase a CDS from a business 
who insures the principal amount between the bond issuer and the investor.  The investor 
receives the CDS in return for periodic payments to the seller until the bond’s maturity date.  
If the bond defaults, which renders the investor unable to receive future interest payments, the 
CDS allows the investor to receive the principal from the seller. See id. 
 86. See FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv (“Companies sold protectionto the 
tune of $79 billion, in AIG’s caseto investors in these newfangled mortgage securities, 
helping to launch and expand the market and, in turn, to further fuel the housing bubble.”). 
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when it could not meet its obligations.  The government ultimately 
committed more than $180 billion because of concerns that AIG’s collapse 
would trigger cascading losses throughout the global financial system.87 
Interdependencies that create risk do not only exist in the context of large 
banksAIG, for example, is an insurance companyeven though banks 
shouldered much of the blame for the crisis.88  Dodd-Frank listed various 
traits to consider when determining nonbank financial companies’ systemic 
risk, such as a company’s leverage, its financial assets, and “the extent and 
nature of the transactions and relationships of the company with [significant 
banks and nonbanks].”89 
B. The Volcker Rule:  Hindering the Proprietary Trading Activities of 
Financial Institutions 
The Volcker Rule is implemented in Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
entitled “Improvements to Regulation of Banks and Savings Association 
Holding Companies and Depository Institutions.”90  The Rule restricts 
banking entities91 from engaging in proprietary trading and from sponsoring, 
acquiring, or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in 
a hedge fund or a private equity fund.92 
The Rule has broad reach, which can be partially attributed to its definition 
of “banking entity.”  “The term ‘banking entity’ means any insured 
depository institution . . . , any company that controls an insured depository 
institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company for purposes of 
section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or 
subsidiary of any such entity.”93  An “insured depository institution” means 
any bank or savings association whose deposits are insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) pursuant to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act.94  A “company that controls an insured depository institution” 
may be a bank holding company or a savings and loan holding company.95  
A company that “is treated as a bank holding company” under the 
International Banking Act of 1978 is generally a foreign bank that has a 
 
 87. Id. at xxv. 
 88. See Manasfi, supra note 19, at 190–91; see also Scott, supra note 77, at 676 (“The 
threat of systemic risk (whether real or imagined) results in both the need for government 
bailouts at taxpayer expense and in an increase in moral hazard. . . .  The politics of supplying 
money to banks are unpopular and unsustainable by the Federal Reserve over the long term 
without intense public scrutiny and loss of independence.”). 
 89. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
 90. Id. § 1851. 
 91. See infra text accompanying note 93 for the definition of “banking entity.” 
 92. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1). 
 93. Id. § 1851(h)(1). 
 94. See Id. § 1813(c)(2)–(3) (“[T]he term ‘insured depository institution’ means any bank 
or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the [FDIC] pursuant to this Act. . . .  
[The term] includes any uninsured branch or agency of a foreign bank or a commercial lending 
company owned or controlled by a foreign bank . . . .”). 
 95. See 12 C.F.R. § 248.2(c)(ii) (2018); see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, VOLCKER 
RULE 7 (2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_ 
Volcker_Rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KDS-PWP6]. 
2018] COMBATING SYSTEMIC RISK 3071 
branch in the United States.96  An “affiliate” or “subsidiary” of these three 
previously defined banking entities are also considered to be banking entities.  
However, the following are excluded from the “affiliate” or “subsidiary” 
designation:  a “covered fund,”97 a portfolio company held under the Bank 
Holding Company Act for merchant banking or insurance investments,98 or 
a “portfolio concern” controlled by a small business investment company.99 
The Rule’s prohibition on proprietary trading restricts banking entities 
from being the principal for their own trading accounts100 or from buying or 
selling securities, derivatives, futures, options, or any other securities 
determined by certain federal agencies.101  Under the Volcker Rule, such 
trading is permitted if it is “designed not to exceed the reasonably expected 
near term demands of clients”102 or where the trader plans to hold the 
instrument as an investment for more than sixty days.103  Despite the Rule’s 
broad prohibitions, it allows multiple “permitted activities,” such as 
transactions involving federal and state governments and agencies, market-
making activities, and risk-mitigating hedging activities.104  Some of these 
activities allow for offshore trading.105 
The Rule’s other prohibition on sponsoring, acquiring, or retaining 
interests in hedge funds or private equity funds prevents banks from buying 
assets with funds containing some of their clients’ and their own money.106  
 
 96. See 12 U.S.C. § 3106(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section (1) any foreign 
bank that maintains a branch or agency in a State, (2) any foreign bank or foreign company 
controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial lending company organized under State 
law, and (3) any company of which any foreign bank or company referred to in (1) and (2) is 
a subsidiary shall be subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and 
to section 1850 of this title and chapter 22 of this title in the same manner and to the same 
extent that bank holding companies are subject to such provisions.” (emphasis added)). 
 97. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 95, at 60 (“[C]overed fundsthe Final 
Rule’s term for any fund that it coversapply to many entities and investment activities that 
would not traditionally have been referred to as ‘hedge funds’ or ‘private equity funds.’”). 
 98. Id. at 7 n.25 (“[Section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Act] describes the authority of 
financial holdings companies to engage in activities that are . . . ‘financial in nature.’  Subject 
to several conditions, this authority may extend to holding an ownership interest ‘as part of a 
bona fide underwriting or merchant or investment banking activity’ in a company that engages 
in activities that are impermissible for the financial holding company itself . . . .”). 
 99. Id. at 7 n.26. 
 100. The Volcker Rule defines trading account as:   
[A]ny account used for acquiring or taking positions in the securities and 
instruments described in paragraph (4) [(the proprietary trading definition)] 
principally for the purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent 
to resell in order to profit from short-term price movements), and any such other 
accounts as the appropriate Federal banking agencies . . . determine. 
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6).  For the Volcker Rule’s definition on proprietary trading, see supra 
note 13. 
 101. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4). 
 102. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B). 
 103. See Final Volcker Rule, Flowcharts:  Prop Trading, DAVIS POLK 4 (Dec. 23, 2013), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/DavisPolk_Final_Volcker_Rule_Flowcharts_Prop_Trading
.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9K6-LP9C] (“A rebuttable presumption that a trade is for a trading 
account arises if the banking entity . . . holds the instrument for fewer than 60 days . . . .”). 
 104. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1). 
 105. See id. § 1851(d)(1)(H)–(I). 
 106. Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B). 
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These fund activities may also be considered a permitted activity; this asset 
management exception allows banks to sponsor, acquire, or retain an interest 
in a covered fund provided that they satisfy certain requirements.107  Banks 
must provide bona-fide-trust, fiduciary, or investment-advisory 
servicesaround which the fund is organizedonly to customers of such 
services of the bank.108  They can neither make more than de minimis 
investments in the fund109 nor insure its obligations.110  They cannot share 
the same name, or a variation thereof, with the fund.111  Bank directors and 
employees cannot retain interest in the fund unless they provide investment-
advisory or other services directly to the fund.112  Banks must provide written 
disclosures to investors that they, not the bank, bear losses in the fund.113 
The prohibition on hedge fund and private equity fund activities includes 
other significant exceptions.  A fund may be considered a “wholly owned 
subsidiary” where all of the ownership interests of the issuer are owned by 
the banking entity or its affiliate, in which case it is not a covered fund.114  
Certain joint ventures115 and acquisition vehicles116 are also not considered 
covered funds.  Within the asset management exception,117 banks may retain 
interest in these funds if they own no more than 3 percent of the fund’s 
assets.118 
 
 107. See id. § 1851(d)(1)(G); see also Final Volcker Rule, Flowcharts:  Prop Trading, 
supra note 103, at 24. 
 108. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(i)–(ii). 
 109. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(iii). 
 110. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(v). 
 111. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(vi). 
 112. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(vii). 
 113. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G)(viii). 
 114. See Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts:  Funds, DAVIS POLK 15 (Jan. 6, 
2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/Davis.Polk_.Final_.Volcker.Rule_.Flowcharts. 
Funds_.pdf [https://perma.cc/795Q-RHQH]; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts:  Funds, supra note 114, at 16.  To 
determine whether a joint venture is a covered fund, several issues arise.  Ownership of the 
issuer must include unaffiliated coventurers, where ownership is divided between a banking 
entity and at least one unaffiliated person.  There cannot be more than ten unaffiliated 
coventurers.  The issuer must engage in activities permissible for the banking entity, which 
does not include investing in securities for resale, such as merchant banking.  Finally, the 
issuer cannot be held out as a private equity or hedge fund. See id.  It cannot raise money 
primarily to “invest[] in securities for resale or other disposition or otherwise trad[e] in 
securities,” which includes merchant banking, insurance company investing, or hedge fund 
activities. Id. 
 116. See id. at 17.  Fewer issues arise to determine whether an acquisition vehicle is a 
covered fund.  First, it must have limited purpose:  the issuer must be formed solely for 
engaging in a bona fide transaction.  Second, it must be limited in time:  an issuer must exist 
only for the time necessary to complete the transaction. See id. 
 117. See supra notes 107–13 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Final Volcker Rule Regulations, Flowcharts:  Funds, supra note 114, at 27 (“The 
maximum permissible investment . . . by a banking entity and its affiliates in a single covered 
fund under the asset management exemption, when aggregated with any ownership interests 
acquired or retained under the underwriting and market making exemption, is 3% of the total 
number or value of the outstanding ownership interests of the covered fund . . . .”). 
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The Rule’s activity restrictions address the compliance of nonbank 
financial companies.119  Such companies are subject to additional capital 
requirements and quantitative limits with respect to the prohibited 
activities.120  However, any permitted activities121 that they engage in are not 
subject to these new sanctions “except as provided in subsection (d)(3), as if 
the nonbank financial company supervised by the Board were a banking 
entity.”122 
II.  CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE VOLCKER RULE 
This Part discusses arguments for and against the Volcker Rule in light of 
Dodd-Frank’s aim to curb systemic risk.  Politicians and the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) typically employ pro-Volcker Rule 
arguments, which generally focus on proprietary trading’s role in the 
financial crisis123 and its inherent risk.124  Part II.A discusses these 
arguments.  In contrast, many economists and law professors have voiced 
displeasure with the Rule for multiple reasons, including its ambiguity, its 
off-the-rack promulgation, and its creation of illiquidity in bond markets.125  
Part II.B speaks to these arguments. 
A.  Proponents of the Rule:  Why It Works 
This Part examines two primary arguments in favor of the Volcker Rule.  
Part II.A.1 discusses how proprietary trading played a role in the financial 
crisis, and Part II.A.2 analyzes the inherent risk in proprietary trading. 
1.  The Role of Proprietary Trading in the Financial Crisis 
One primary argument in favor of the Volcker Rule is that proprietary 
trading must be curbed due to its role in the financial crisis.  Luis Aguilar, 
SEC Commissioner from 2008 through 2015, makes this argument in his 
statement on the Volcker Rule upon its promulgation.126  Aguilar alludes to 
the sentiment that public bailouts forced taxpayers to cover banks’ losses due 
to their proprietary trading, a “key contributor to th[e] crisis.”127  He notes 
 
 119. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2012).  The Board of Governors is permitted to determine 
which nonbank financial companies it can supervise. See Id. § 5323(a)(1); see also supra note 
89 and accompanying text. 
 120. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2). 
 121. See id. § 1851(d)(1). 
 122. Id. § 1851(a)(2); see also id. § 1851(d)(3) (“The appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
the [SEC], and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall, as provided in subsection 
(b)(2), adopt rules imposing additional capital requirements and quantitative limitations, 
including diversification requirements, regarding the activities permitted under this section if 
the appropriate Federal banking agencies . . . determine that additional capital and quantitative 
limitations are appropriate to protect the safety and soundness of banking entities engaged in 
such activities.” (emphasis added)). 
 123. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 124. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 125. See infra Part II.B. 
 126. Press Release, Luis A. Aguilar, supra note 15. 
 127. Id. 
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that proprietary trading creates substantial investor protection risks:  “Indeed, 
banks have, in the past, created and marketed products that were secretly 
designed to fail.”128  Commissioner Aguilar lauds the Volcker Rule and 
concludes that “[p]roprietary trading . . . racked up huge losses and was one 
of the factors that forced American taxpayers to bail out the banking 
system.”129 
Professor Onnig Dombalagian’s similar comments reinforce 
Commissioner Aguilar’s statement that taxpayers were forced to cover 
banks’ losses due to proprietary trading.130  Dombalagian writes that 
regardless of whether proprietary trading was a precipitating cause of the 
crisis, it plainly “exacerbated losses in connection with the securitization and 
related derivatives activities that contributed to the recent collapse of the 
financial sector.”131 
Dombalagian further notes that proprietary trading’s destabilization of 
cash and derivatives markets, which exacerbated losses in the crisis, is a 
justification for the Rule.132  Proponents of the Rule argue that proprietary 
trading “increases the complexity . . . and latent interconnectedness of over-
the-counter derivatives markets.”133  The largest banking institutions conduct 
most transactions in these over-the-counter (OTC) markets so, absent 
adequate collateralization and markets to standardize these instruments, 
indirect counterparty credit risk rises dramatically.134  In early 2010, Neal 
Wolin, former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, made this statement to the 
Senate Banking Committee:  “Major firms saw their hedge funds and 
proprietary trading operations suffer large losses in the financial crisis.  Some 
of these firms ‘bailed out’ their troubled hedge funds, depleting the firm’s 
capital at precisely the moment it was needed most.”135  With this statement, 
Wolin echoes Dombalagian’s concern for counterparty credit risk in 
proprietary trading before the crisis, as discussed above. 
2.  Proprietary Trading’s Inherent Risk 
A second argument in favor of the Rule rests on the inherent risk of 
proprietary trading, which banks seemingly transfer to their clients.  The 
notion that banks marketed products that were designed to fail, as 
Commissioner Aguilar stated, resonates in an article by Senators Jeff 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading:  Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and 
Scofflaws, 87 CIN. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (2012) [hereinafter Dombalagian, Of Scourges, 
Scapegoats, and Scofflaws] (“A causal relationship between such proprietary trading and the 
financial crisis is more difficult to establish, although it is easier to assert that proprietary 
trading exacerbated the impact of the crisis.”); Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive 
Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. REV. 469, 470 (2013) [hereinafter Dombalagian, 
Expressive Synergies]. 
 131. Dombalagian, Expressive Synergies, supra note 130, at 470. 
 132. See Dombalagian, Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws, supra note 130, at 393. 
 133. Id. at 398. 
 134. See id. 
 135. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9 (2010). 
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Merkley and Carl Levin on combating proprietary trading after the crisis.136  
Senators Merkley and Levin, both staunch Volcker Rule supporters, argue 
that creating and marketing products to clients that were secretly designed to 
fail is a notable way in which banks put their own proprietary trading interests 
ahead of their clients’ interests.137  After massive financial deregulation in 
the late twentieth century, competition rose and commercial and investment 
banks grew rapidly, which fueled proprietary trading.138  This increase 
allowed banks to deal with more complex assets whose risk was transferred 
to clients.139 
The Senators’ argument centers on a study of a CDO that Goldman Sachs 
created in 2006 to reduce its exposure to RMBSs.140  Dodona I, LLC, 
invested in two synthetic CDO offerings from Goldman, named Hudson 
Mezzanine Funding 2006-1 (“Hudson 1”) and Hudson Mezzanine Funding 
2006-2 (“Hudson 2”).141  Dodona purchased $3 million of Hudson 2 notes 
and $1 million of Hudson 1 notes in early 2007.142  The CDOs’ credit quality 
deteriorated rapidly as the housing market collapsed, and their ratings 
subsequently plummeted as Goldman received insurance payouts due to the 
downgrades.143  In April 2011, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations cited Hudson 1 and Hudson 2 in its findings on the financial 
crisis.144  With respect to these CDOs, the Subcommittee concluded that 
Goldman “issued and sold to clients . . . CDO securities containing or 
referencing high risk assets that Goldman Sachs wanted to get off its 
books.”145 
The Senators’ description of the Rule’s prohibition against proprietary 
trading illustrates their broad defense of the Volcker Rule:  “This is a self-
executing Rule of law that establishes a clear and strong statutory prohibition 
on banks engaging in high-risk activities.”146  They further recognize how 
important, yet difficult, implementation of the prohibition and its exceptions 
would be:  “The statutory language provides significant direction . . . but 
regulators must still flesh out the details.  This will be a challenging process.  
 
 136. See Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Restrictions on Proprietary Trading 
and Conflicts of Interest:  New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 
523 (2011). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 521–22. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. at 523–34. 
 141. See Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 142. See id. at 635. 
 143. See id. (“By mid-2008, Standard & Poor’s had downgraded $286 million of the 
Hudson 2 notes, and the Hudson 1 notes were downgraded to junk status.”). 
 144. See id.; see also Wall Street and the Financial Crisis:  The Role of Investment Banks:  
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111 Cong. VII–IX (2010). 
 145. Dodona I, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 635.  Dodona sued Goldman Sachs, alleging violations 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as common law fraud, aiding and abetting 
fraud, fraudulent concealment, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 630.  For a discussion of the 
outcome of this lawsuit, see infra Part II.B. 
 146. Merkley & Levin, supra note 136, at 539. 
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In particular, the permitted activities covered by ‘market-making,’ ‘risk-
mitigating hedging,’ and ‘organizing and offering’ private funds . . . deserve 
special attention.”147  They certainly echo Commissioner Aguilar’s concerns 
for both the role of proprietary trading in the crisis and its riskiness, which 
certain securities offeringsthose seemingly designed to failhave 
demonstrated. 
B.  Opponents of the Rule:  Why It Fails 
This Part examines various arguments against the Volcker Rule to counter 
the pro-Volcker stances discussed in Part II.A.  Part II.B.1 discusses how 
proprietary trading played an insignificant role, if any at all, in the financial 
crisis.  Part II.B.2 then addresses alleged ambiguity in the Rule’s language.  
Part II.B.3 suggests that the Rule is unable to actually reduce systemic risk.  
Next, Part II.B.4 introduces the notion that the Rule’s promulgation was 
primarily crisis-driven.  Part II.B.5 discusses how the Rule may have a 
detrimental impact on bond market liquidity.  Finally, Part II.B.6 examines 
how parties that are not as regulated as banks have absorbed risk as a result 
of the Rule. 
1.  Proprietary Trading’s Limited Role in the Financial Crisis 
The most notable criticism of the Volcker Rule may be that the role of 
proprietary trading in the financial crisis was insignificant.148  As mentioned 
above, although Professor Dombalagian believes that this type of trading 
exacerbated losses after the crisis, he also believes that the notion that 
proprietary trading actually led to the crisis is relatively tenuous:  “A causal 
relationship between such proprietary trading and the financial crisis is more 
difficult to establish, although it is easier to assert that proprietary trading 
exacerbated the impact of the crisis.”149 
Some argue that the Rule’s definition of proprietary trading does not cover 
much activity that led to the crisis.150  According to Professor John C. Coffee 
Jr., “there is almost no evidence that proprietary trading was responsible for 
the failure of any financial institution in the 2008 crisis.”151  He notes that 
firms that failed, such as Lehman Brothers, did so because of “ill-advised 
principal investments.”152  In particular, Lehman made undiversified, 
overleveraged acquisitions of both real estate lenders and developers.153  The 
Rule exempts these principal investments, which Coffee uses to suggest that 
the Rule may even be “seriously underinclusive” of the true causes of 
institutional failure during the crisis.154 
 
 147. Id. at 542–43. 
 148. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 1073–74 (citing Terry Pristin, Risky Real Estate 
Deals Helped Doom Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at C6). 
 149. Dombalagian, Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws, supra note 130, at 392–93. 
 150. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 9, at 1074. 
 151. Id. at 1073. 
 152. Id. at 1073–74. 
 153. Id. at 1074. 
 154. Id. 
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The FCIC report’s two dissenting opinions reflect many critics’ arguments 
that proprietary trading was absent in the crisis.155  For instance, the dissents 
contradict the majority’s use of Goldman Sachs CDOs as an example of 
proprietary trading’s role in the crisis.  In the second dissent, Wallison and 
Burns refer to CDOs as merely a method of transporting risky mortgages—
the true culprits—which undermines Senators Merkley and Levin’s 
criticisms of Goldman Sachs’s Hudson CDOs.156  Although these CDOs 
made Dodona incur significant losses at Goldman’s expense, based on their 
reasoning, it is possible that Wallison and Burns might advocate fixing 
securities with inherent, substantial risk, rather than scorning the methods by 
which they are traded. 
According to Wallison and Burns, such scorn for the banks’ use of CDOs 
does not focus on the main source of market risk that precipitated the crisis:  
twenty-seven million nontraditional mortgages that poor origination 
standards perpetuated157 with a value exceeding $4.5 trillion.158  To stress 
this point, Wallison and Burns critique statements made in a private interview 
between FCIC members and Larry Summersformer head of the White 
House Economic Council and one of President Obama’s key advisorsabout 
whether the mortgage meltdown was a key contributor to the crisis.159  
Summers stated that the meltdown was like a “cigarette butt” thrown in a dry 
forest, which created a forest fire that was the financial crisis.160  Wallison 
and Burns attack this claim with their own interesting analogy to stress the 
apparent role that the creation of subprime mortgages played in the crisis: 
Let’s use a little common sense here:  $4.5 trillion in high risk loans was 
not a “cigarette butt;” they were more like an exploding gasoline truck in 
that forest.  The Commission’s [majority] report blames the conditions in 
the financial system; I blame 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages—
half of all mortgages outstanding in the U.S. in 2008 . . . .  No financial 
system, in my view, could have survived the failure of large numbers of 
high risk mortgages once the bubble began to deflate . . . .161 
As a potential counterargument to how banks’ use of CDOs built market 
risk, Dodona’s suit against Goldman ultimately failed in the Southern District 
of New York years after Senators Merkley and Levin’s article was 
published.162  The court eventually granted summary judgment to Goldman 
against Dodona’s fraud-based claims.163  Finding that such an apparently 
damning trading practice lacked fraud may further undermine the Senators’ 
use of this anecdote in their article to condemn proprietary trading’s alleged 
design to fail.  The court noted that Dodona lacked evidence to demonstrate 
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certain risks that Goldman knew of but failed to disclose; such thinking was 
merely speculation.164  Although emails from Goldman employees indicated 
that they thought that mortgage credit markets were deteriorating, such 
language did not establish that Goldman’s practice of concealing risk was a 
“knowing business strategy.”165  Goldman also had no duty to disclose its 
strategy of reducing exposure to RMBSs through the Hudson CDOs.166 
Although Dodona claimed Goldman concealed the likelihood that the 
CDOs would decline in value, Dodona again lacked evidence showing that 
Goldman concealed material investment risk.167  Dodona’s expert testimony 
established that Goldman had asymmetric information about its intent and 
purpose but could not support a finding for material omissions.168  In fact, 
the expert testimony actually established that Goldman had disclosed the 
disputed material information.169 
2.  The Volcker Rule’s Ambiguity 
The role of proprietary trading in the crisis aside, many articles employ 
other arguments criticizing the Volcker Rule.  The Rule’s sheer ambiguity 
and intractability is noted as “Wall Street’s most frequent complaint” about 
the Volcker Rule.170  This ambiguity has burdened banks as it has “force[d 
them] to stay away from the edges of what’s allowed.”171  This anti-Volcker 
argument has actually received a degree of bipartisan support.172  When 
agreeing with Republican Senator Mike Crapo, the Senate Banking 
Committee Chairman, about the need to simplify the Rule, Democratic 
Senator Heidi Heitkamp stated, “It is my experience that when a rule’s too 
complicated, there isn’t much compliance, so it doesn’t really get you what 
you need.”173 
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The Rule went through the administrative process both incomplete and 
contested before it even entered the rulemaking phase.174  Even before 
publishing the Rule’s notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), effectively 
implementing the Rule required differentiating banned proprietary trading 
from permitted proprietary trading, such as market making.175  Although this 
inquiry required extensive rulemaking, it is still problematic today.176  Much 
political tension accompanied this issue as critics and proponents clashed on 
how broadly or narrowly the Rule should define terms.177  The Financial 
Stability Oversight Council received more than 8000 comments on the rule 
in a thirty-day period before the NPRM, which is uncommonly high.178  This 
high comment activity continued into the post-NPRM period, when nearly 
18,500 comments were given.179  This onerous promulgation left tremendous 
uncertainty about the Rule’s scope, costs and benefits, and many of its 
provisions.180 
Outside of the Volcker Rule’s promulgation, there are two particular 
sources of ambiguity in the Rule’s language.  First, the definition of 
“proprietary trading”181 turns in part on the definition of “trading 
account.”182  Proprietary trading under the Rule concerns “engaging as a 
principal for the trading account of [a] banking entity,”183 and trading 
accounts refer to “any account used for . . . taking positions in the securities 
and instruments described in [proprietary trading’s definition] principally for 
the purpose of selling in the near term.”184  This “purpose test” in the 
definition of “trading account” has become a subjective, fact-intensive 
inquiry into the traders’ intent at the time of the transaction, which introduces 
considerable complexity.185 
The second instance of ambiguity is in the line between proprietary trading 
and the exception for market-making activities.186  The root of this 
exception’s complexity is primarily based on whether such activities exceed 
the reasonably expected near-term demands of clients, which imposes a limit 
on the amount of securities banks can hold in their market-making 
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inventory.187  The Treasury has noted that this “Reasonably Expected Near 
Term Demands” (RENTD) framework is problematic because banks may not 
have enough inventory to make markets in instruments where the RENTD is 
too narrow.188 
3.  Lack of Evidence Suggesting the Volcker Rule’s Ability 
to Reduce Systemic Risk 
Another attack on the Volcker Rule cites a lack of evidence that the Rule 
decreases systemic risk.  Professor Hal Scott similarly criticizes the Rule for 
its inability to curb systemic risk.189  He posits three main reasons for this 
belief.  First, proprietary trading is relatively uncommon among banks:  
“Wells Fargo and Bank of America, two of the largest deposit-funded banks, 
are estimated to earn less than 1% of revenues from proprietary trading.”190  
Second, systemic risk in the financial system is not concentrated solely in 
banks.191  None of the most notorious failures of the financial crisisFannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Bear Stearns, or Lehmanoccurred in deposit-
taking banks.192  Third, losses from lending and securitization were the real 
cause of the financial crisis and, therefore, focusing on and prohibiting 
proprietary trading is improper.193  Scott cites supporting data from Goldman 
Sachs, which estimates that losses from lending and securitization constituted 
about 80 percent of U.S. banks’ overall credit losses.194 
Professor Julie Manasfi’s article on systemic risk and the Volcker Rule 
similarly posits that no evidence exists to establish either that deregulation 
led to the financial crisis or that the Rule will decrease systemic risk.195  Like 
Wallison and Burns’s dissent,196 Manasfi cites the removal of the Glass-
Steagall wall, but she highlights its boons:  “[It] may have allowed banks to 
achieve diversification, liquidity, complementaries, and global 
competitiveness.”197  Manasfi warns that banning proprietary trading might 
erode these benefits and would ignore the “underlying causes of the excessive 
risk taking” that facilitated the crisis.198 
Manasfi stresses the need for more studies on excessive risk-taking before 
implementing a broad prohibition on proprietary trading.199  She echoes 
claims that proprietary trading carried a diminished role in the crisis:  “[T]he 
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financial crisis . . . was likely caused by failures in our financial system that 
reach beyond proprietary trading in general.”200  Because of this diminished 
role, immediate calls to prohibit this trading activityespecially considering 
its potential benefitsmay be overstated.  The benefits of proprietary trading 
aside, such an outcome would put U.S. banks at a global disadvantage.201  
Her conclusion asks, “If we are trying to reduce systemic risk, why not study 
excessive risk taking in general and regulate more precisely instead of 
banning proprietary trading by banks and systemically significant entities 
altogether?”202  This question summarizes Manasfi’s argument as a call to 
properly diagnose the problem to treat its specific causes before 
implementing overinclusive solutions. 
4.  An “Off-the-Rack,” Crisis-Driven Regulation 
Manasfi’s call to investigate excessive risk-taking before prohibiting 
proprietary trading alludes to another argument against the Volcker Rule:  it 
is an “off-the-rack,” crisis-driven regulation.  Professor Roberta Romano best 
describes this argument as she criticizes “crisis-driven legislation” because it 
“often adopts off-the-rack solutions along with open-ended delegation to 
regulatory agencies . . . who perceive a political necessity to act quickly.”203  
She explains that the Volcker Rule’s promulgation was tedious and involved 
a “lengthy gestation period,” albeit without evidence of industry capture.204  
This lack of capture demonstrates the “deep and genuine intellectual 
disagreement on both the efficacy and workability of the Volcker Rule.”205  
This conflict may further undermine the plausibility of promulgating a rule 
quickly in response to a crisis without sufficiently evaluating the financial 
industry’s comments on the matter. 
Romano reiterates the notion that proprietary trading played “no 
meaningful role” in the crisis,206 which further questions the need to enact a 
rule concerning an issue that may be irrelevant to Dodd-Frank’s broad 
objective of curbing systemic risk.  She attacks legislators for focusing on 
potentially irrelevant activities like proprietary trading rather than pertinent 
ones:  “Although legislation plainly should seek to anticipate future financial 
crises and not solely address past ones, directing . . . regulatory efforts on 
resolving known and pressing regulatory issues over speculative ones is self-
evidently a more rational and prudent regulatory agenda, given scarcity in 
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agency time and resources.”207  This lack of focus becomes even more 
troubling when one considers that the Volcker Rule is estimated to cost 
banking entities nearly, if not more than, $4 billion.208  Romano advocates 
sunsetting, which would allow Congress to reassess and revise the Rule.209 
5.  The Volcker Rule as a Detriment to Bond Market Liquidity 
Another criticism of the Volcker Rule is that it stifles bond market 
liquidity.  In his study of the Rule, Jack Bao, Principal Economist for the 
Federal Reserve, provides an empirical analysis of the Rule’s impact “on 
liquidity for corporate bonds, particularly during stress events.”210  Bao uses 
downgrades of corporate bonds to junk status as stress events where clients 
demand liquidity.  He then compares this illiquidity to a control group both 
before and after the Rule’s promulgation.211  Bao concludes that prohibiting 
proprietary trading has “significant costs.”212 
The study’s primary finding is that the Rule’s net effect is detrimental to 
corporate bond liquidity and that, under the Rule, dealers are less willing to 
provide liquidity during times of stress.213  Some weak evidence even 
suggests that dealers not subject to the Rule have provided liquidity in these 
stress times.214  With respect to the market-making exception in particular, 
Bao states that 
the rules defining this exemption are cumbersome, and their 
implementation unwieldy, with the result that bank dealers have indeed 
pulled back from corporate bond market making in stress periods post-
Volcker.  This may suggest . . . that “an attempt to separate legitimate and 
acceptable market-making from speculative and risky market-making is not 
productive.”215 
 The finance community has echoed Bao’s concerns:  “Bankers say it stifles 
what is the essence of Wall Streettrading stocks, bonds and other 
instruments.”216  Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs has affirmed these 
illiquidity worries: 
“[Banks] should be able to be principals because market-making is a very 
important public function of companies like ours,” Blankfein said. “If we 
don’t do that, the drop in liquidity will not allow . . . industries and investors 
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to accomplish their objectives, which are beneficial to the financial 
markets.  There should be more flexibility.”217 
6.  Less Regulated Nonbank Entities May Absorb 
Risk That Banks No Longer Assume 
A final criticism of the Volcker Rule is that it pushes risk inherent in 
proprietary trading to less-regulated nonbank entities.  Professor Darrell 
Duffie’s paper on market making under the Rule suggests that prohibiting 
proprietary trading could push certain market-making activities to nonbank 
entities such as hedge funds or insurance companies, neither of which are 
heavily regulated.218  Duffie argues that this shift contradicts congressional 
intent and may also “have unpredictable and potentially adverse 
consequences for the safety and soundness of our financial system.”219  He 
admits that the Financial Stability Oversight Council still designates large 
nonbank dealers as systematically important but notes that the Federal 
Reserve’s liquidity support is more difficult to arrange for such dealers.220  
The assumption that nonbank market makers will have adequate regulatory 
supervision, liquidity, and effective capital and liquidity requirements seems 
idyllic.221 
Private equity firms’ entrance into the RMBS market is evidence that some 
nonbank entities have begun engaging in proprietary trading, which 
reinforces Duffie’s concerns.222  Banks and government lenders pulled back 
from this space after regulatory crackdowns during the financial crisis, which 
allowed other entities to purchase their delinquent mortgages.223  Large 
private equity firms entered this space and began purchasing, securitizing, 
and selling RMBSs as banks had done before the crisis, but with far less 
oversight.224  These firms saw an opportunity to invest in distressed assets 
that banks and lenders were looking to sell quickly: 
As new regulations prompted banks to scale back their servicing of 
mortgages, companies owned by private equity went on a buying spree.  
Private equity sensed an opportunity as the mortgage servicing business 
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became a liability for the banks, leading Bank of America alone to reach 
settlements worth billions of dollars over federal accusations of using 
illegal foreclosure documents and unfair rejections of loan modifications.  
Since 2012, Nationstar[, a private equity firm that became the fourth-largest 
collector of mortgage bills,] has bought the rights to collect payments on 
more than $450 billion in mortgages, much of it from Bank of America.225 
Although evidence suggests that private equity activity in the RMBS 
market has benefited the U.S. economy,226 seizing this opportunity has 
garnered sharp criticism.  Banks, unlike private equity firms, are obligated to 
meet the credit needs of low-income neighborhoods under the Community 
Reinvestment Act.227  Private equity investment in RMBSs has not benefited 
poor neighborhoods in the way that banks would have if they were the 
investing entity.228  Private equity firms are also allegedly foreclosing on 
homeowners quickly and losing families’ mortgage paperwork, mistakes that 
banks have been accused of.229  Private equity firms’ mortgage-originating 
subsidiaries face less scrutiny than banks, which raises further concerns that 
there is inadequate testing for their financial soundness.230 
III.  AMENDING THE VOLCKER RULE 
The Volcker Rule seeks to advance Dodd-Frank’s broad objective of 
curbing systemic risk, but it does so at some apparent expense to the 
community it regulates.  The issue of whether the Rule ultimately advances 
Dodd-Frank’s goals, as well as whether it should actually be repealed or 
amended, still persists.  Despite tremendous complexity surrounding the Rule 
and its implications, this Note proposes certain amendments to the Volcker 
Rule with an aim to demystify its ambiguous language.  Part III.A discusses 
how amending the Volcker Rule is appealing because it is feasible to allow 
banks to engage in profitable trading while regulating and curbing excessive 
risk-taking.  Part III.B details this Note’s recommendations for amending the 
Rule:  simplify the definition of proprietary trading, broaden the market-
making exception to the Rule’s prohibition, and implement greater 
protections against risk-taking that do not affect trading directly. 
A.  Striking a Balance:  Allowing Banks to Profit and 
Curbing Excessive-Risk-Taking Are Not Mutually Exclusive 
Neither repealing the Volcker Rule nor completely upholding its current 
version seem proper.  Notwithstanding credible concerns about its hurting 
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bond liquidity,231 it is plausible that the Rule does not fully achieve Dodd-
Frank’s goal of eliminating systemic risk.232  Arguments that proprietary 
trading played an insignificant role in the crisis233 certainly fuel criticism that 
the Rule is an unnecessary, off-the-rack regulation.234  In contrast, whether 
the Rule actually does promote illiquidity is uncertain and may be impossible 
to know.235  Excessive risk-taking and increasingly risky trading activities 
fueled the crisis236 as proprietary trading undoubtedly exacerbated losses due 
to securitization and derivative transactions.237 
Rather than outright repealing the Rule or completely upholding it, striking 
a balance between both sides of this debate seems more proper.  This balance 
entails curbing systemic risk while allowing banks to continue to profit by 
finding a way to allow banks to engage in and profit from proprietary trading 
while ensuring that they are not induced to show excess profits in a way that 
causes them to carry enormous risk.  That latter inducement is an inherent 
problem because banks are publicly traded companies; they will always want 
to show growing profits to appease their shareholders.  This natural 
inclination will inevitably push banks toward proprietary trading or other 
risky, yet profitable, activities. 
The opportunity to potentially amend the Volcker Rule may help 
regulators to strike a balance between letting banks follow their natural 
public-company instinct while curbing excessive risk-taking in their pursuits.  
Banks are likely to be more receptive to this balance than to full repeal.238  
Jerome Powell, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, spoke to this notion 
directly at a Senate Banking Committee hearing after his nomination for his 
current role:  “In our view, there is room for eliminating or relaxing aspects 
of the implementing regulation in ways that do not undermine the Volcker 
Rule’s main policy goals.”239 
This Note recommends amending the Volcker Rule primarily by 
simplifying the Rule’s language.  Members of both political parties recognize 
issues arising from such ambiguity and complexity240their most frequent 
complaintwhich must be rectified to allow banks to engage in profitable 
trading while operating within clear boundaries of the law.241  Such clarity 
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may also help corporate liquidity and market making during times of 
stress.242 
B.  Recommendations 
First, this Note recommends eliminating the “purpose test” to simplify the 
definition of proprietary trading.243  Such a modification would likely have 
support from both the financial services industry244 and the Treasury 
Department.245  This test determines whether a trading account is used 
“principally for the purpose of selling in the near term,” which establishes 
whether a trading account exists.246  Satisfying this subjective, fact-intensive 
inquiry governs whether a particular activity is deemed to be proprietary 
trading.247  Eliminating this test from the definition of trading account will 
focus that definition on whether short-term trading occurs, which 
subsequently simplifies the definition of proprietary trading.  The rebuttable 
presumption that a trade constitutes proprietary trading if a position on a 
trading account is held for less than sixty days, a generally accepted 
notion,248 may supplant the purpose test to establish a bright-line rule that 
minimizes confusion and maximizes judicial economy.  The amended 
language of § 1851(h)(6) should read: 
The term “trading account” means any account used for acquiring or taking 
positions in the securities and instruments described in paragraph (4) . . . 
for . . . selling in the near term . . . , which is defined as a position that is 
held for less than sixty days, and any such other accounts as the appropriate 
Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in 
subsection (b)(2), determine.249 
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Second, this Note recommends broadening the exception to market 
making.250  Both actors in financial services251 and the Treasury 
Department252 would likely welcome fewer constraints on this crucial 
activity. 
An opt-out provision from the RENTD framework if certain criteria are 
met, as the Treasury has suggested, may unshackle banks from limits to 
engaging in market making.253  The Treasury offers two approaches.  First, a 
bank may opt out of the RENTD requirement if it “adopts and enforces 
narrowly tailored trader mandates that ensure that its activities constitute 
market making, provided that the [bank] complies with all the other 
conditions of the market-making exemption.”254  Second, a bank may opt out 
if it “fully hedges all significant risks arising from its inventory of” the 
investment at issue.255  Regardless of which opt-out provision a bank uses, it 
still must comply with all other clauses in the market-making exception and 
the Rule’s broader proprietary trading ban.256  An example of altered 
language of § 1851(d)(1)(B) follows: 
The purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of securities and other 
instruments described in subsection (h)(4) in connection with underwriting 
or market-making-related activities, to the extent that any such activities 
permitted by this subparagraph are designed not to exceed the reasonably 
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties, but 
where a banking entity fully hedges all significant risks arising from its 
inventory of the instrument in the transaction, it may waive the requirement 
of not exceeding the reasonably expected near term demand.257 
Third, this Note recommends implementing three protections to further 
buffer systemic risk, which do not adversely affect banks’ abilities to profit.  
Under the first protection, various risk and conflict of interest disclosures 
may be required for certain transactions made under one of the Rule’s 
exceptions.258  Julie Manasfi posits that requiring additional disclosures may 
better reduce systemic riskparticularly by correcting potential conflicts of 
interestthan banning proprietary trading before having seriously studied 
excessive risk-taking: 
If we are trying to correct potential conflicts of interest, why not regulate 
and require additional disclosures that protect the public from such 
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conflicts of interest?  If we are trying to reduce systemic risk, why not study 
excessive risk taking in general and regulate more precisely instead of 
banning proprietary trading by banks and systemically significant entities 
altogether?259 
The majority opinion in the FCIC’s report noted its concern that, before 
the crisis, traders were rewarded for quick trades without realizing the long-
term consequences; this helped to catalyze a dramatic failure in risk 
management.260  The majority viewed this failure as a “key cause” of the 
financial crisis.261  The need to complete various disclosures about trades 
exempt from the Volcker Rule’s prohibition may help to placate these 
concerns.  It would make traders think more deliberately about future 
consequences of their transactions while slowing down the process. 
The second protection calls for a change in compensation systems at large 
financial institutions whereby banks cannot pay traders based on trading 
profits, which may promote better risk management.  This protection would 
further mitigate the FCIC majority’s concerns that the inadequate 
compensation systems of large banks rewarded short-term gains without 
considering long-term consequences.262  The effect of this proposed 
protection would complement the first protection of requiring additional 
disclosures.263  Ryan Bubb and Marcel Kahan propose a prohibition on 
paying traders based on trading profits, which they posit is a “better way to 
achieve the objectives of the Volcker Rule, at far lower cost.”264  
Notwithstanding intentwhether a transaction is proprietary trading 
whereby the trader intends to create profit or the trading is merely incidental 
to making profit, such as market makingthis approach would target the 
ability of banks to engage in proprietary trading directly.265  It would also 
avoid an unintended, adverse effect of the Volcker Rule’s “define-and-ban 
approach.”  Under the Rule, banks feel threatened and are incentivized to find 
loopholes that conceal their trading, which perpetuates the need for 
increasingly complex regulation.266 
The third protection involves supporting more capital and liquidity 
requirements, which may conservatively buffer market-making risks.  This 
protection is intended to mitigate risks associated with broadening the 
market-making exception directly.  For instance, Darrell Duffie writes that 
regulatory capital and liquidity requirements may help treat the systemic risk 
associated with banks’ market making more effectively than the Rule 
itself.267  In contrast with the Rule’s market-making exceptionwhich may 
only reduce the capacity of market making that banks providesuch 
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requirements treat risk on a portfolio-wide basis and directly consider a 
bank’s soundness and potential to cause systemic risk.268 
CONCLUSION 
The financial crisis of 2008 created a debate about the adequacy of U.S. 
financial regulations that will likely persist for generations.  It will 
undoubtedly prompt future actors in politics and in the financial services 
industry to think about how the early 2000s ushered in a new economic era 
haunted by true fears of systemic risk. 
The Dodd-Frank Act embodied this debate over the causes of the financial 
crisis as many of its provisions have proved politically contentious.  The 
Act’s venerable objective of curbing systemic risk was met with particular 
quarrel when the Volcker Rule was enacted—proponents and opponents of 
the Rule clashed on the topic of proprietary trading.  The issues of whether 
proprietary trading precipitated the crisis, whether it is actually a source of 
systemic risk, and whether the Volcker Rule truly limits systemic risk have 
culminated in President Trump’s vow to at least amend the Rule.  He has 
taken a tangible first step269 by successfully nominating Jerome Powell for 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, who publicly stated that the Rule can be 
simplified without hindering its vision.270  We now must wait to see whether 
Powell will take action on the Volcker Rule during his tenure as Chairman. 
As the Volcker Rule’s fate seems in flux, neither an outright repeal nor the 
status quo seem proper given credible arguments on both sides.  It seems 
most appropriate to strike a balance between allowing banks to engage in 
profitable trading while ensuring that they do not take excessive risk or 
perpetuate systemic risk in the financial system.  This balance requires an 
understanding of the sources of ambiguity and complexity in the Rule.  
Simplifying the definition of proprietary trading, broadening the market-
making exception, and implementing further protections to bolster risk 
management and buffer market-making risk may help to establish this 
balance.  Despite this Rule’s remarkable complexity, finding this balance 
may be key to ensuring a sound financial system with healthy banks, large 
and small, that can regain the trust of American consumers. 
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